Security for Small States

by 2LT Choe Tse Wei

The world has never been a very safe place for small states. It has become even less so with the advent of superpower rivalry, ideological conflicts, scrambles for mineral wealth and international terrorism in the decades after World War II. History has shown the evident ease with which larger powers have manipulated countries weaker than themselves either economically or militarily. World history chronicles the stories of smaller states haplessly swallowed up by larger ones, whether in the days of Prussia or in the deserts of the sub-Sahara.

Yet there have been instances where this has not happened, where certain small states have managed not only to survive as independent and sovereign entities, but also to flourish politically and economically amidst much larger countries. Switzerland is one long-standing example of this instance, and she has since been joined by Costa Rica, Israel, Singapore and a host of other Pacific and Caribbean micro-states.

This article will comment on the evolution of the small state in the decades after World War II, and outline the factors which have enabled some of these states to thrive in the world community despite their size.

The Evolving Concept of the Small State

The concept of sovereignty and self-determination for small states has undergone an evolution over the past several decades. Prior to World War I, any country weak and vulnerable was easy prey to an opportunistic large power. Even Imperial China under the Manchus was an easy prey to the colonial powers of the West.

World War I and President Woodrow Wilson ushered in a modification of this traditional "free-for-all" attitude adopted towards less powerful nations. The Wilson Doctrine stressed the inherent right of all people to self-determination. This new concept gave support to the concept of a "small state" - a concept which had not seemed possible in the harsh climate prevailing in world politics. No doubt, in the period immediately following the enunciation of this policy, there was still little change in the plight of small states. Nevertheless there was now introduced the important concept that a small state did deserve the right to exist independently, free from the bother of any larger country. In other words, freedom was a right of every country, large or small, and it was no longer a privilege granted by a larger country to a smaller one, as and when it pleased to do so.

However, before this concept could be applied, the world was once again torn apart by the trauma and horrors of another World War. It took another great war to drum in the urgency of peace for all.

After World War II, the period of decolonisation together with the establishment of the United Nations allowed the concept of a small state to come to fruition at last. Large numbers of former colonies became independent, and the UN saw more and more nations of nominal size joining it for example, countries like Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Cambodia, Guyana and Singapore.

But the issue of independence did not stop just there. Although these states are all technically independent, that is, they all have a seat in the UN, sadly, many of them soon sank into the quagmire of internal revolt and foreign interference. Some quickly lost the independence they had yearned and worked so long for. Many grew disillusioned with independence as it turned out not to be the Utopia they had hoped for. Yet, among this litany of sad tales, there were a few happier sparks to light up the scene. A few states did manage to maintain independence, economic growth and enhance security.

What made the difference between the small states which sank and those which swam? Luck played a part, to some extent, but hard work and sensible policies were what really mattered. This article looks into the factors which helped guarantee peace and security for the more fortunate of small sates. It also evaluates the price at which this security was obtained and concludes with a comment on which of these factors form a cost-effective foreign policy for a small state living in a dangerous world.

Military Defence

"Let him who desires peace, prepare for war."

- Flavius V Vegetius

The establishment of a credible defence force remains one of the best means by which to guarantee security against external threats. The rationale behind the creation of such a force is summed up succinctly by the term "poison shrimp strategy". Here, a small nation is compared to a small shrimp in a sea where fish of varying sizes can be found. It is powerless against a large predatory fish (that is a great power) but it can still poison any smaller fish (that is smaller aggressor) that might wish to swallow it. In other words, "the poison shrimp strategy" aims to make invasion so costly for the aggressor as to make it unprofitable from the economic or strategic viewpoint. This ensures that the shrimp will remain safe from aggression. Military deterrence along these lines of reasoning have formed the crux of the security thinking of the most successful of today's independent small states like Israel, Switzerland and Singapore.

The determination to use the forces, if forced to, is equally responsible in warding off aggressors. This is underscored by a Swiss anecdote dating from World War II. It was said that Hitler's general, Hermann Goering, toured Switzerland prior to World War II and whilst inspecting a Swiss guard of honour, stopped to speak to one of the Swiss soldiers.

"How many soldiers does Switzerland have?" Goering asked.

"One million, Sir," replied the soldier.

"What if Germany sends two million soldiers to invade

Switzerland?"

"Then each Swiss soldier will shoot twice, Sir."

Suffice to say, history has shown that Germany never touched Switzerland at all during World War II.

Defensive might plus the will to use this might, if need be, is thus a major factor in ensuring peace. It has the quality of being almost totally within the control of the state concerned. After all, the quality and size of one's defence force is determined by how much money and effort one is willing to invest in it, unlike other policies, for example, foreign relations which require the co-operation of other countries not within one's control before they can begin to work. Consequently, defence is usually the most trustworthy factor to a country's security.

Having a credible defence force also allows small states to take advantage of the competing interests and manoeuvres of the superpowers. If attacked, it must be able to resist any such action long enough to bring about an effective response from the superpowers.

Where small states are concerned, the maintenance of a credible defence force takes a few facets. Firstly, the institution of a citizen's army through national service is seen as necessary to ensure a large pool of trained soldiers easily mobilised in a crisis without constituting a large drain on the national economy's labour force in peacetime. All of the successful small states practise this to some extent. Israel, Taiwan, Switzerland and Singapore all have well-known and well-funded citizens' armies that are considered crucial in the maintenance of their deterrence capability. They all stress quality to compensate for smaller numbers, for instance, the quality of men, mobility, morale, training and equipment.

Secondly, efforts have not been spared in purchasing adequate defence materials for use by the citizens' army. All four nations mentioned above are known to have bought, or manufactured, weapons of good quality, if not state-of-the-art, for their forces.

Thirdly, it requires the establishment of sufficient back-up armaments allows industries to modify, assemble and manufacture weaponry in case foreign supplies are cut off. Taiwan and Israel, with limited links with other countries, tend to rely heavily on domestic arms manufacture. Switzerland has the renowned Oerlikon arms manufacturer. Sweden has Saab and Bofors, whilst Israel has the Israeli Air Industries.

Fourthly, all these countries actively encourage their population to support their defence forces and hold them in high public esteem. The institutions of the armed forces are generally respected and this moral support permits the defence effort to continue with little social resistance or legislative hindrance.

But building a strong defence force has one drawback. Often the development of a powerful defence force has evolved at the expense of the growth of the economy. When a significant proportion of the limited resources of a state's Gross National Product (GNP) is laid aside for defence expenditure, then that amount will not be available for use in improving the living standards of the population as a whole. This situation is commonly referred to by economists as the "guns or butter" situation. A good illustration would be Israel. Undoubtedly, the possessor of the finest defence force of any small state, Israel also suffers from a problem-riddled economy with triple-digit inflation, double-digit unemployment. She relies heavily on the United States for financial assistance in propping up her defence spending. Sweden, too, has had to divide her resources between social welfare expenditure and defence spending. Consequently, though Swedish social welfarism is highly developed, the country does not yet have the anti-submarine capability necessary to ward off the Soviet mini-submarines that frequently intrude into her territorial waters. Conversely, Japan has been able to thrive economically because her defence commitments have until recently, been at a relatively low level of one percent of her Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Another problem posed by a strong defence force is the potential this has for arousing resentment amongst neighbouring countries. Israel and her Arab neighbours have never been friendly anyway, but her strong and active army provides an added barrier to reaching a Middle East peace settlement. Only Switzerland has had the good fortune of having friendly European neighbours who have long accepted her vigorous defence policies.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy, the art of making friends, remains an important means by which a small state can be secure against external threats. Since it cannot hope to win any major conflict on its own, the small state must therefore endeavour to win more friends in order to reduce the chances of conflict. To this end, countries like Switzerland, Austria and Singapore have striven to be at peace with nations from all ideological backgrounds. They profess neutrality with regard to most issues not affecting their immediate interests. In fact, Switzerland goes to the extent of refusing membership in international groupings like the UN or the EEC, much less in any military alliance. She adheres to a strict policy of sitting-on-the-fence in peace, and she will deny the forces of both East and West the use of her territory or facilities in wartime. By this, she has managed to escape the ravages of two World Wars. To varying degrees, this policy of diplomatic neutrality is followed by other small states like Finland, Singapore and many of the micro-states of the Pacific and the Caribbean. Only small states with powerful armies can afford to take sides in world politics. Even then, like Taiwan, they need to be supported by the US, a superpower.

However, even neutrality and diplomacy have drawbacks if used as the only means of keeping peace because eagerness to befriend can be interpreted by hostile neighbours as a sign of weakness. This applies to countries both large and small. In 1938, Britain's Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, met Nazi leader, Adolf Hitler, in an attempt to talk peace. Chamberlain returned to London happily proclaiming he had achieved "peace for our time... peace with honour", but Hitler did not interpret it the same way. Thinking that Britain was not prepared to stand in Germany's way, Hitler annexed Czechoslovakia and began the invasion of Europe. Similarly, the 1982 Falklands conflict began because Argentina thought Britain would not resist the Argentine annexation of these islands.

Elsewhere, excessive pre-occupation with neutrality has led to instances where a country has so much respect for another that her foreign policy is tailored specially to avoid offending the other country. In this instance, we see that the original aim of neutrality degenerates into one of accommodation and appeasement.

To be truly effective, erstwhile diplomacy should still be backed up by a credible army. This would thus be the practical embodiment of Theodore Roosevelt's call to "talk softly whilst carrying a big stick". The combination of diplomacy and defensive capability gives double incentive to the other countries to stay at peace with a small state.

Multi-lateral Involvement

One novel way to ensure peace is for a small state to promote "multi-lateral involvement" in its own security. It is essentially a balance of power strategy which seeks to have all great and medium powers of both East and West to have a strategic and economic stake in the continued existence of a small state. This method of guaranteeing security was used in Siam by her rulers in the last century, and it proved effective enough to make Siam the only Southeast Asian nation to remain free from colonisation. This method is also used by Singapore today to ensure that both East and West will want her to stay independent in order to preserve their own vested interests here. One of the basic tenets of Singapore's policy for survival is to develop a balance of power structure conducive to her continued security. This depends on the superpowers being convinced that:

Singapore is of considerable strategic and economic value to each of them.

The direct interests of each power can be served without bringing her under anyone's sole domination.

The interests of each power can be preserved only by preventing the domination of Singapore by other powers.

Consequently, Singapore has worked to make herself a neutral centre of trade, commerce, communications and finance useful to all powers, and capable of absorbing and integrating their presence and influence. She encourages these foreign interests to compete so that none of them will attain a dominant position. An Assistant-Secretary at the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs states this policy quite accurately when he wrote:

"Since time immemorial, external forces have exerted themselves on the lands and peoples of this area: it would be idle to wish for a cessation of outside involvement in the region, in one guise or another. As of now, there seems little prospect of a complete withdrawal of the major powers from Southeast Asia strategically, economically or diplomatically. Rather than try to keep out all outsiders, therefore, it would be better for as many interested powers as possible to come in and develop a stake in the region, thereby ensuring that no single power gets into a dominant position".

To date, this policy has been effective in ensuring Singapore's security. The only disadvantage being that it requires a country's leadership to walk on a tightrope, forever having to balance one influence against another in an effort to maintain the delicate equilibrium in the balance of power.

Alliances

"Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world."

- George Washington

Alliances have always been a means by which countries buttress their security with the co-operation of others. Disregarding the need to form alliances and preferring instead to rely on the size of her army, a small state will never really be in a position to engage in a long-term conflict with her much larger enemies. The most she could do is to put up a spirited resistance that would be costly to the aggressor. An alliance, then, would enable her to draw on the strength of more powerful allies.

For Luxembourg, membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organsation (NATO) is crucial to her security. Israel and Taiwan have historically relied on the US for help in times of crises. Singapore and Malaysia are associated with the rather informal Five Power Defence Arrangements.

Nonetheless, it is also apparent that Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden have no alliances whatsoever, preferring instead to rely on a policy of utmost neutrality to ward off hostile attention. This points to a conflict in the various ways of ensuring security: the policy of neutrality runs counter to the policy of using alliances as a means of providing security from external threats. Both methods cannot be embraced simultaneously, and both methods are not in themselves wholly foolproof. Neutrality is viable only if a superpower chooses not to attack and alliances work only if their signatories do not change their political fancies overnight as they are usually wont to do. History is littered with examples of failed alliances and shattered friendships. Alliances work best when no strain of self-interest is placed on them. Given a war, they soon crumble to pieces as friends grow scarce in the actual hour of need. In addition, in an alliance between a small and large state, the former frequently has to abide by the wishes of the latter in exchange for protection. Sometimes, the small state finds itself a de facto vassal of the larger one, having to make concessions in her foreign policy in exchange for protection from the larger state. This has indeed been the case for the Cuba-USSR and the Warsaw Pact alliances, where the smaller states have become client satellites of the USSR.

The UN and Other World Forums

Although the UN has often shown itself to be unable to arrive at or implement solutions to the world's political crises, it still has a role to play in safeguarding peace and security for small states. In this respect, the UN functions, firstly, as a forum where small states can present their problems and interests for discussion. Secondly, it serves as a channel for multi-lateral aid from the industrial to the developing states. Finally, it is a convenient place for small states that cannot afford a large network of embassies to maintain contact with as many countries as possible. In short, the UN and other international organisations like the British Commonwealth play an important part in helping to air grievances and defuse tensions before these can threaten the security of small states. It was UN mediation that helped bring peace to Cyprus.

Internal Political and Social Stability

The racial, religious, social and ideological conditions of a given nation will determine its internal security and also its ability to withstand external threats. Small states with closely-bounded societies enjoying domestic harmony are clearly more resistant to security threats than those with class-enmity, racial tensions or internal schisms. One need only compare tranquil Switzerland and New Zealand with strife-torn Sri Lanka to realise the truth of the above statement. Since the decay of a society is usually the first stage in the eventual loss of a nation's security, this factor is extremely important when we consider the criteria needed for a stable nation. Clearly, the saying "united we stand, divided we fall" has much relevance to the security of any nation.

Economic Growth and Strengths

The economic health of a nation influences the security outlook in no small way; not least because a good defence force requires a sound economy to support it. Furthermore, a nation with a good standard of living and a thriving economy is much less likely to fall prey to internal unrest and external interference. Taiwan, Singapore and Switzerland are examples of states with healthy economies that contribute to stability and peace. They can utilise their trading links with the world to enhance friendships and improve regional ties.

Geopolitical Significance of a Nation

Sometimes, it may just be possible that a nation can remain relatively secure simply because she has no real geopolitical value to any major power. She would have nothing to offer any power in terms of sea control or the establishment of military bases. This seems to have been the case for many of the isolated mini-states of the Pacific and Carribbean island-states like Antigua, Barbados and Micronesia which have populations of only a few hundred thousands and economies which concentrate on plantation agriculture and tourism. These beautiful islands are blessed with relative calm because they are not blessed with much else of any strategic value.

Nonetheless, it is worthy to note that Falklands, Grenada, Vanuata and Fiji were formerly also 'unimportant' mini-states that rapidly assumed immense international significance simply because political changes affected either their own politics or the politics of their larger neighbours.

Conclusion

Every nation must select those policies which are deemed most compatible with that nation's regional and domestic environment. In making the selection, cool-headed pragmatism and sensible evaluation are needed. Only then will a nation succeed in having a foreign policy that is effective in preserving security. Only then will a country avoid the fate that usually befalls smaller and weaker players in world politics.

Biblography

1. 'Singapore', in Towards Tomorrow: Essays on Development and Social Transformation in Singapore, Singapore, NTUC, 1973.

2. Hanna, Willard A., 'The New Singapore Armed Forces,' AUFS Southeast Asia Series, Vol. 21, No. 1, Jan. 1973

3. Wilairat, Kawin, Singapore's Foreign Policy: A Study of the Foreign Policy System of a City-State, Georgetown University, Washington on D.C., USA, 1976.

4. Wu, Yuan-li, Strategic Significance of Singapore: A Study in Balance of Power, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D. C.

LTA (NS) Choe Tse Wei is presently a business executive in the Development Bank of Singapore.

Last updated: 18-Jul-2005

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_4/9.htm